Guarantees & Limitations
What Veylent Guarantees
1. Tamper Evidence
Each signer's document hash is the SHA-256 of the exact bytes they saved, and every signed version is a byte prefix of the final file. Desktop Verify cuts the file at each signer's layer, rehashes it, and compares the result with the sealed record anchored on-chain. Changing any byte a signer covered produces a mismatch, and anything added after the last signature is reported as changed-after-signing. The blockchain record cannot be altered to match the tampered document.
2. Temporal Proof
The blockchain transaction includes a block timestamp. This proves the signature existed at or before that time. The timestamp cannot be backdated.
3. Signer Privacy
Signer personal data is encrypted with a unique per-signature key. The API server cannot read it. Only someone with physical or digital access to the QR code can decrypt the signer details.
4. Signature Chaining
Multiple signatures on the same document form a verifiable chain. Each signature references the previous signer's anchor ID, creating an ordered, immutable sequence. The contract rejects a reused anchor ID and a previous anchor ID that was never anchored, so a chain can only be extended, never forked onto made-up predecessors.
5. Offline Document Handling
The PDF bytes never leave the signer's machine. The API receives only hashes and encrypted metadata. This is particularly important for confidential documents.
What Each Check Proves
| QR scan (web or mobile) | Desktop Verify | |
|---|---|---|
| Who signed and when | Yes, from the sealed record checked against the on-chain composite hash | Yes, same check for every signer |
| The record belongs to this QR code | Yes, the record names the scanned anchor ID | Yes |
| The file in hand is what was signed | No. A scan never sees the document | Yes, each signer's layer is rehashed and compared |
| Nothing was added after the last signature | No | Yes (changed-after-signing otherwise) |
| Signature order | Shows chain length only | Yes, each record must link to the previous anchor ID |
A verified scan means a Veylent signer sealed those details at that time. It does not mean the paper or file in front of the verifier is unchanged. For that, open the file in the desktop app.
What Veylent Does NOT Guarantee
1. Identity Verification
Veylent authenticates signers via magic link (email verification), Google OAuth, or Microsoft OAuth. Each signature records a trust anchor indicating the authentication method (e.g. "google", "email"). However, this confirms account ownership, not real-world identity. Veylent does not perform KYC -- it does not verify that "Jane Doe" is who she says she is beyond what the auth provider confirms. Future integrations with government ID providers (e.g. Singpass, eID) will offer stronger identity assurance.
2. Document Content Validation
Veylent proves a document was signed, not that the document's content is accurate, legal, or binding. The legal weight of a Veylent signature depends on jurisdiction.
3. Revocation
Once a signature is anchored on-chain, it cannot be revoked. If a signer wants to repudiate a signature, they must do so through external means (legal process, counter-signature, etc.).
4. Document Integrity from a QR Scan Alone
A QR scan confirms the signer and the time, but does not check that the PDF content matches the anchored document hash. Someone could copy a genuine QR code onto a different document, and the scan would still show the original signer. Full integrity checking requires the desktop app.
5. Files Re-Saved by Other Apps
Desktop Verify relies on each signer's layer still being in the file byte for byte. Re-saving a signed PDF in another app (an editor, a "Save as" from a viewer, a PDF optimiser) usually rewrites the whole file. The signers' layers can then no longer be found, and Verify reports the file as rewritten. It cannot confirm the content in that case, even if it looks the same. Keep and share the file exactly as Veylent saved it.
6. Legacy Files
Files signed with earlier Veylent formats did not anchor a hash of the saved file. Verify reports them as legacy and does not check them, and they can't be signed further.
7. Key Recovery
The key exists only in the QR code and in the signed file's signing history. If both are lost (for example, the only copy was printed and the paper is destroyed), the key is gone. The anchor remains on-chain, but the sealed record cannot be opened, so neither the signer details nor the document hash can be checked.
Comparison Matrix
| Property | Veylent | PKI / X.509 | Centralized Services | Notary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tamper evidence | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| No trusted third party | Yes | No (CA) | No | No |
| Survives vendor shutdown | Yes | Partial | No | Yes |
| Privacy from platform | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Identity verification | No | Yes (CA) | Yes | Yes |
| Revocation | No | Yes (CRL) | Yes | N/A |
| Offline signing | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Legal recognition | Varies | Broad | Broad | Broad |